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Abstract 
 
By considering banks as portfolios of assets in different locations, we study how real estate 
shocks are transmitted across bank’s business areas while controlling for local demand shocks 
and bank location–specific factors. Affected banks substantially alter their loan portfolios: we 
find evidence of real estate price declines affecting both real estate and non-real estate types of 
lending. Banks also roll over and fail to liquidate problematic loans, while accumulating more 
non-performing loans. These results provide evidence of internal contagion of real estate 
shocks within banks. 
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Introduction 
Triggered by shocks in the real estate sector, the financial crisis of 2007–2009 was associated 
with a loss of real output, causing upheavals in the economy. Evidence has shown that the 
reduction in the aggregate credit in the US economy at the time came mostly from the reduction 
of bank (or intermediated) credit rather than direct credit (Adrian et al. 2012). This substitution 
suggests that banks’ credit supply may have been substantially reduced during the crisis 
(especially for small firms who do not have access to the bond markets) and that banks may thus 
have played a major role in the transmission of the shocks coming from the real estate sector 
(Carvalho, Ferreira and Matos 2015).  
In this paper, we study this internal contagion process, by focusing on the effects of real estate 
price declines on banks’ loan product portfolio and on the role the mismanaged bank lending 
during the recent crisis played in prolonging the economic stagnation. Existing evidence suggests 
that such “zombie lending” took place in Japan during the 1990s (Peek and Rosengren 2005; 
Sekine,  Kobayashi,  and  Saita 2003),  and  that  this  produced substantial  economic  damage 
(Caballero,  Hoshi,  and  Kashyap  2008). In this paper, we investigate how the real estate shocks 
that triggered the most recent financial crisis affected the composition of the banks’ loan 
portfolio, both in terms of the type of products on offer, and in terms of their solvency.  
We find that in response to real estate price declines, banks substantially altered their loan 
portfolios: not only did they significantly reduce their real estate related lending, but these cuts 
also spilt over across business lines, including types of lending that were not directly related to 
real estate. The evidence suggests an interesting pattern that is informative of the portfolio 
implications for the deleveraging decisions of banks. Across all types of lending, interbank loans 
(which were relatively liquid) and commercial/industrial loans (which were relatively risky) were 
disproportionally more affected. This suggests that banks sold the most-liquid assets first (i.e., 
assets that face less-asymmetric information and are widely held by other banks). They then cut 
down risk exposure by lowering the holdings of the most-risky assets, consistent with the existing 
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theory and evidence on constrained liquidation (Manconi, Massa and Yasuda 2012; Ben-David, 
Franzoni, and Moussawi 2012; Brown, Carlin, and Lobo 2010). We find significant effects on the 
treatment of existing loans: more affected banks continued to bet on the resurrection of their 
insolvent loans during the last crisis. Following real estate price declines, banks opted to roll over 
loans more frequently, recognize fewer losses and liquidate fewer loans, accumulating more non-
performing loans. This suggests that a significant number of banks continued to keep toxic loans 
on their balance sheets, likely in fear of falling below their minimum capital levels. This 
continued financing, or “evergreening” (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap 2008; Bruche and Llobet 
2012) thus introduced additional distortions to the already shaken economy. 
A relevant challenge when measuring the impact or real estate shocks on banks’ policies is to 
differentiate their direct effect on banks policies from the effects on the demand for bank services 
(Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina 2010). While the literature has offered some solutions to 
partial-out demand effects (see Peydro 2010 for instance), they are in general limited to the 
estimation of supply effects of homogeneous loans and data limitations often restrict the 
representativeness of the results. In this paper, we use an alternative approach and focus on 
identifying the effect of transmission mechanisms via banks’ balance sheets from the effect of 
local demand, while being agnostic about the nature of the initial shocks. Using the geographical 
coverage of banks, we can consider each bank as a portfolio of real-estate locations. Thus, we can 
identify the effect of real estate losses on their lending and balance sheets, while controlling for 
local conditions in a given point in time. 
Our approach implicitly compares the total bank-level effect of a balance sheet shock with the 
one that would result by adding up the individual local effects. More specifically, we measure 
how the aggregate exposure of a bank to real estate shocks affects its policies over and above the 
sum of the local effects predicted by other banks present in the same locations.
1
  Using this 
strategy we find evidence of balance sheet contagion effects across business lines for a broad 
population of firms (banks) during a long period of time (the real estate crisis).  
                                                          
1
 We also combine this strategy with a measure of direct real estate holdings in a difference-in-differences specification. 
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To motivate the analysis, we first show that, banks report capital losses in line with their 
exposure to real estate and change their policies according to these capital losses. More 
importantly, we find that the aggregate exposure of a bank to real estate shocks indeed affects its 
policies over and above the sum of the local effects, suggesting a significant propagation effect. 
In particular, when compared to local single-MSA banks, multi-MSA banks that have large 
negative real estate exposure elsewhere cut down their lending more.
2
 This set of results echo the 
findings in the contagion literature, where portfolio holdings of international investors are shown 
to be channels via which crisis spreads (Forbes and Rigobon 2002; Boyer, Kumagai, and Yuan 
2006; Jotikasthira, Lundblad and Ramadorai 2012).  
Although large banks are likely to spread the effect of real estate shocks across geographical 
locations and business lines, we find that they cut down their lending less, relative to small banks. 
This set of results highlights the role played by the banks’ internal capital markets, indicating the 
resiliency of large diversified banks. It resembles the finding of differential reactions of 
multinationals and local firms to negative exchange rate shocks in Desai, Foley and Forbes 
(2008). Furthermore, resiliency, as shown by Matvos and Seru (2013), comes from the resource 
allocative role of the internal capital market in their study of the consequences of 2007/2008 
credit shock on diversified firms’ value. There is a long line of theoretical literature on the cost 
and benefit of internal capital markets (Stein 1997; Scharfstein and Stein 2000; Rajan, Servaes 
and Zingales 2000). An optimal portfolio management of location and business lines distributes 
the impact of economic shocks across business lines and locations. This increases the resiliency 
of individual banks that have diversified operations, but also creates additional channels of 
contagion that generate real effects beyond a particular sector or region.
3
 Our research highlights 
both of these channels. 
To measure the spillover effects of real estate price fluctuations we start by considering banks 
                                                          
2 Single-MSA banks are banks that operate only in one Metropolitan Statistical Area (henceforth MSA), while multi-MSA banks 
operate in 2 or more MSAs. 
3 Similar contagion channels are shown in the hedge fund industry. Lo (2007) finds the margin constraints of multi-strategy hedge 
funds spread the negative shock in the single strategy hedge funds (e.g., in the area of subprime credit) across the hedge fund 
industries, causing the quant fund-wide crisis in August 2007.    
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as a portfolio of real estate locations. In our first approach, we construct measures of real estate 
shocks that take into account the different weights that each location represents in the bank’s 
overall business and construct bank-specific real estate price indices that aggregate prices across 
all the locations in which the bank operates. As different banks in a given location can also 
operate elsewhere, we introduce time-location fixed effects to control for local business 
conditions, local loan demands or local credit shocks at a given point in time and bank-location 
fixed effects to control for any time-invariant conditions of each bank in each of its locations of 
operation. By saturating the model in this particular way, we measure whether the aggregate real 
estate prices that a bank is exposed to have a spillover effect beyond the sum of the local effects 
in each location. For some policies, like lending, that are likely to be partially determined locally 
finding an effect beyond the sum of the local parts indicates a contagion effect across 
geographies, while for policies that are determined bank-wide, it suggests an amplification effect.  
Our second strategy uses the banks’ own holdings of real estate assets in the form of property 
plant and equipment (PP&E) as a measure of cross-sectional exposure to real estate shocks. The 
distribution of PP&E across banks is a result of different forces to the specific business locations 
chosen by the bank, and is largely historically determined. Even if PP&E is not the main source 
of banks’ exposure to real estate prices, it still constitutes a sizable source of exposure, and it 
provides a clean cross-sectional source of variation that does not suffer from endogeneity 
concerns.  This allows for an identification strategy that is akin to a difference-in-difference 
estimation in which two treatment variables interact. The first difference is determined but the 
bank-specific real estate shocks and the second difference is determined by the bank’s cross-
sectional exposure to real estate shocks via PP&E.
4
  
 The existing literature has mainly focused on the transmission
5
 of positive shocks to 
banks’ balance sheets or on the geographical transmission per se: Gilje et al. (2016) focus on 
positive shocks and show that positive funding windfalls from shale discoveries are transmitted 
                                                          
4 We also replace the actual variation in real estate prices with a predicted measure that uses only countrywide real estate price 
changes and local land supply price elasticities Saiz (2010) which is immune to reverse causality considerations.  
5 See, Gan (2007) for a related analysis of the Japanese experience in the 1990s or Puri et al. (2011) for Germany during the 
current crisis. 
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via bank branch networks to non-shale areas, and result in an increase in mortgage lending 
activity. Cortés and Strahan (2017) show that negative shocks, from natural disasters, result in 
reduced lending in areas connected via bank branch networks that are not directly affected by 
natural disasters. However, there is less evidence on the role of internal capital markets in 
propagation of these shocks and how they affect banks’ loan portfolios in terms of types of loans 
on offer. In this paper, we fill this gap.  
Our empirical set-up allows us to examine a broad set of lending outcomes (cf. Gilje et al. 
2016). Our real estate shocks are likely to decrease both capital and local lending opportunities, 
hence our results can be unambiguously attributed to the consumption of capital rather than to 
increased lending in other locations (cf. Cortés and Strahan 2017).  
Our paper is related to the bank lending channel literature, which examines how shocks to 
banks affect their ability to lend and end up affecting the firms that borrow from them (Kashyap 
and Stein 1995, 2000; Kishan and Opiela 2000; and Ashcraft 2006).
6
 While our work covers the 
downturn in the real estate market after 2006, existing literature has mostly focused on the 
housing boom that preceded it. Analyzing the housing boom of 1998-2006, Chakraborty, 
Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2016) document that banks which were active in strong housing 
markets increased mortgage lending and decreased commercial lending. Loutskina and Strahan 
(2015) consider the role of financial integration among banks in amplifying housing price shocks 
during this period. They find that banks move mortgage capital out of low-appreciating housing 
markets and into high-appreciating housing markets within their own branch networks. 
Several of our findings deserve attentions: first, we document substantial contagion of 
negative real estate shocks across banks’ business lines, which has important implications for the 
overall transmission of shocks in the US economy. Second, we find that following real estate 
price declines, more liquid and more risky loans are disproportionally more reduced. This 
suggests that banks off-load the most-liquid assets first (i.e., assets that face less-asymmetric 
                                                          
6
 See also Ashcraft (2005), Khwaja and Mian (2008), Paravisini (2008), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), and Schnabl (2012). 
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information and are widely held by other banks). Third, our results suggest that banks buy time 
and obfuscate their losses by managing their problematic loans. More affected banks are more 
likely to accumulate non-performing loans and, in relative terms, are less likely to liquidate them 
and recognize losses. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we discuss the related literature. Section 2 
presents the data, and we discuss the empirical strategy in Section 3. We present the results in 
Section 4 and conclude in Section 5. 
1 Related Literature 
At a broad level, our paper is related to the macro literature that shows how shocks to the 
financial system affect the credit supply (Peek and Rosengren 1997; Kashyap et al. 1993; 
Kashyap and Stein 2000; among others).
7
 Recently, Adrian et al. (2013) showed that during the 
2007–2009 crisis, there was a sharp contraction in the supply of intermediated credit through 
banks that contrasts with the inelastic demand for credit from firms. The shortfall is made up of 
direct credit, such as bond financing, indicating that financial frictions operate mainly through the 
credit supply. This raises the question as to whether a dollar of credit through the banking system 
behaves differently from a dollar of direct credit. Our paper contributes to the existing 
understanding of the sharp reduction of intermediated credits by revealing how intermediaries 
such as banks react to adverse shocks and how the various constraints they are facing affect their 
responses.  
At the micro level, our paper is closely related to the literature that studies how shocks to 
banks affect the lending relationship between banks and their borrowers, i.e., firms—specifically, 
the amount and terms of lending (Gan 2007; Paravisini 2008; Khwaja and Mian 2008; Jimenez et 
al. 2012; Iyer at al. 2014). This prior literature relies on within-firm estimators to eliminate the 
effects of credit demand. Instead, we use the geographical reach of banks as a rich source of 
                                                          
7 The literature also argues that adverse shocks may operate through the demand of credit by affecting borrower net worth and the 
collateral value of assets (Bernanke and Gertler 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). Studies such as Ashcraft and Campello (2007) 
have also shown that there is a firm balance-sheet channel of monetary policy.
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variation that allows us to control for demand-side effects.
8
 The within-firm approach has the 
appeal of dealing easily with the correlation between firm demand and bank characteristics. This 
requires that demand and other selection effects are constant and additive within firm and across 
banks. Conversely, the within-bank approach has the drawback that it cannot be used for bank 
policies other than lending. In particular, any aggregate policy of the bank cannot be identified 
with a firm. We provide complementary evidence to this literature by showing how banks cope 
with adverse shocks to their capital by implementing a menu of policy changes that go beyond 
lending, including financial and commercial policies. Relative to these two previous streams of 
the literature, our approach allows us to document the transmission of real estate shocks on the 
full population of US banks for a broad period of years.  
Our paper is also broadly related to the recent literature that studies the transmission of shocks 
across bank branch networks. Gilje et al. (2016) show that positive funding windfalls from shale 
discoveries are transmitted via bank branch networks to non-shale areas, and result in an increase 
in mortgage lending activity. Cortés and Strahan (2017) show that negative shocks, from natural 
disasters, result in reduced lending in areas connected via bank branch networks that are not 
directly affected by natural disasters. Our paper adds to this literature in that we study how 
exogenous shocks to bank capital affect a broad set of lending outcomes, and changes in the 
bank lending portfolio composition, not only mortgage lending. Further, the fixed-effects 
structure in our empirical set up allows us to examine how real estate shocks to the whole 
portfolio of locations in which a bank operates affect (local) bank lending outcomes. Our results 
are based on all locations and real estate price fluctuations providing better extrapolability 
properties than those based on large location-specific shocks. (cf. Cortés and Strahan (2017)).  
Similarly, Carvalho, Ferreira and Matos (2015) study the transmission of bank distress to 
nonfinancial firms from 34 countries during the 2007–2009 financial crisis using systemic and 
bank-specific shocks. They find that bank distress is associated with equity valuation losses and 
                                                          
8 Drechsler et al. (2015) also use the geographical reach of banks as a source of variation to identify how bank competition affects 
the deposit rates of bank branches in response to monetary shocks.
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investment cuts to borrower firms with the strongest lending relationships with banks and that the 
losses are not offset by borrowers’ access to public debt markets. 
Our results are also linked to the growing body of literature that studies zombie lending in 
Japan (Peek and Rosengren 2005; Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita 2003). Caballero, Hoshi, and 
Kashyap (2008) argue that by accumulating underperforming loans, Japanese banks prevented 
the entry of more efficient firms and caused the Japanese “lost decade” of growth. Bruche and 
Llober (2014) study a solution to this problem in the context of the last financial crisis. 
Further, our paper relates to the body of literature that discusses the cross-border bank 
amplification effects of capital shocks. Bruno and Shin (2013) study the acceleration of bank 
capital flows through the bank leverage channel. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) study the effects 
of the financial crisis on foreign banks’ US branch lending activity. 
We also analyze the downsizing of banks’ assets across different business lines, similarly to 
the literature on the deleveraging decisions of a distressed portfolio investor. This literature is 
mostly motivated by the liquidity crises of 1998, starting with Scholes’s presidential address at 
AFA (2000). It was observed that at the onset of the crisis, investors who were either facing 
margin constraints or regulatory constraints needed to offload assets in the portfolio to raise 
liquidity ratios. Empirical investigation reveals that mutual funds—and particularly hedge 
funds—tend to sell off liquidity assets first, and more so for those funds who face constraints that 
are more binding (Manconi, Massa and Yasuda 2012; Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi 
2012). Brown, Carlin, and Lobo (2010) study the deleveraging issue theoretically and find that 
the distressed investors have to make a further trade-off. That is, if the distress shock has a 
permanent component, distressed investors might sell off some of the illiquid assets as well so 
that their portfolio faces less of an impact from the liquidity downward spiral when further 
distress shocks strike. Empirically, this means that distressed investors might sell off liquid assets 
first to fend off the initial round of negative shocks. When shocks become permanent, they sell 
off more illiquid assets to limit the illiquidity exposure of their portfolio. Our results are 
informative of the portfolio implications for the deleveraging decisions of banks. One direct 
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implication is that banks tend to liquidate assets that are most liquid, i.e., assets that face less-
asymmetric information and are widely held by other banks. 
Finally, although our focus is the period of housing bust, our paper is broadly related to the 
growing literature studying the impact of the U.S. real estate boom on the larger economy 
(Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar 2012; Cvijanović 2014; and Adelino, Schoar, and Severino 2015) 
among others). While these papers suggest banks had an active role in the housing boom, our 
main finding is that banks have played a major role in potentially propagating the shocks coming 
from the real estate sector during the real estate downturn. 
2 Data 
We collect bank balance sheet data from the Federal Reserve’s Report of Condition and 
Income (“Call Reports”). Our sample consists of quarterly data on all deposit-insured commercial 
banks. We include only bank-quarter observations with non-missing information on total assets, 
total loans, and equity. The data cover the period spanning from the last quarter of 2005 to the 
last quarter of 2010, giving a total of 98,497 observations covering 2,435 banks. Our dataset 
contains detailed information from the Schedule RC – Balance Sheet on loans and leases (total 
loans, C&I loans, real estate loans, consumer loans, etc.), cash and balances due from depository 
institutions, securities, trading assets and liabilities, deposits in domestic offices, deposits in 
foreign offices, other assets and liabilities, derivatives and off-balance sheet items. The data also 
contain information about certain flow variables related to problematic loans, such as loss 
recognitions, loans declared non-performing and recoveries. 
Information about the geographical distribution of bank deposits is obtained from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
9
 House prices are obtained from the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA) and are calculated at the level of a Core Based Statistical Area 
(CBSA).
10
 The data contain a CBSA-level house-price index for 369 CBSAs. We obtain MSA-
                                                          
9 More specifically, we obtain the data from the Summary of Deposits. FDIC reports data on total deposits, location and 
ownership of all bank branches from 1994 onward (see http://www2.fdic.gov/sod/). 
10 A CBSA is a geographic area defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). It is based around an urban center of at 
least 10,000 people and adjacent areas. CBSAs largely overlap with Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA), also defined by the 
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level land supply elasticities from Saiz (2010). Elasticities are available for 269 Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) in our sample. The MSA-level elasticities are then converted to the new 
CBSA definitions by employing a zip-code matching procedure. 
As an alternative data source for the geographical distribution of bank loans, we use the 
relatively new data on small business loan originations collected under the auspices of the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). Since 1996, larger banks have been required to report the 
number and amount of their (calendar-year) small business loan originations by census tract.11 
Banks and thrifts report small business and farm data and community development data if they 
have total assets greater than $1 billion dollars (asset level adjusted annually for inflation starting 
in 2005). Prior to 2005, institutions with asset levels above $250 million were required to report 
these data. Small business loans are defined as loans in amounts of $1 million or less. Small farm 
loans are defined as loans in amounts of $500,000 or less. We merge the CRA small business 
loans data with our sample by hand matching the Respondent IDs from the CRA data with the 
Bank IDs.  
Summary statistics for the bank balance sheet data are shown in Table 1 (Panels A, B and C). 
Table 1 Panel D contains summary statistics on house prices and land supply elasticities, while 
Panel E contains the details of our sample banks’ geographical dispersion. 
The characteristics of our sample are in line with other papers that use the Call Reports as the 
main source of data. The mean bank in our sample had $107 billion in total assets in the last 
quarter of 2005, with $57 billion in total loans (corresponding to 67% of total assets). The median 
bank had $724 million in total assets, with $495 million in total loans (corresponding to 70% of 
total assets). The mean total equity capital to total assets ratio is almost 11% (with the median 
being 9.5%). The average tier 1 capital ratio is 9.2%, with a median of 8.1%. Real estate loans as 
a fraction of total assets average 46.3% in our sample, with a median of 47.1%. Property, plant 
and equipment constitute 1.7% of total assets on average.  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
OMB. 
11 Available from http://www.ffiec.gov/Cra/craproducts.htm. 
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As shown in Panel D, the CBSA-level land supply inelasticities range from 1 (least inelastic –
Indianapolis) to 4.40 (most inelastic – Miami). Here, we define land supply inelasticity em as 
[1+max(elasticity.) - elasticitym], where elasticitym is obtained from Saiz (2010). The national 
real estate price indices obscure the variation in the regional/CBSA real estate market conditions. 
In the period between the first quarter of 2006 and the end of the sample in the last quarter of 
2010, the highest drop in local house prices was witnessed in San Diego (-48% over the five-year 
period). Over the same period, house prices in Portland fell by a mere 1.95%. Figure 1 shows the 
aggregate change in house prices for all CBSAs in the sample throughout the whole period. The 
figure shows significant variation across regions. During this same period, the Case-Schiller US 
House Price index recorded a drop of 31% in the national house price levels. 
As shown in Panel E, there are 1,968 single-MSA banks and 487 multi-MSA banks in our 
sample, giving 40,595 (57,902, respectively) bank-MSA-quarter observations. Conditional on 
operating in more than one MSA, the median number of MSAs in which a bank operates is 17. 
3 Empirical Strategy 
We aim to explain the effect of losses induced by decreasing real estate prices on bank 
policies. The empirical strategy considers banks as conglomerates of local branches, in which the 
branches in each location operate as a division. Each branch is influenced by shocks that affect 
the bank as a whole and shocks that affect the specific location in which the branch operates.
 12
 
However, given that multiple banks have branches in a given location, we can partial out the 
local shocks that homogeneously affect all banks in a given location in an additive way.  
The first step of our identification strategy is to construct a bank-specific real estate price 
index. This is an aggregate price index across all the locations in which a bank operates. To do 
so, we use static weights wmi0 for each bank (i) - location (m) combination, according to the 
relative weight at the beginning of the sample, using deposits of a bank in a given location 
(CBSA).  The weight wmi0 is constructed as the fraction of deposits of a bank i in location m with 
                                                          
12 Note that our definition of a branch is a bank-location pair, and it may include different bank offices (that are also commonly 
known as branches) that operate in a given location. 
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respect to the total deposits of the bank at t = 0 (we use the fourth quarter of 2005, one quarter 
before our estimation sample starts).
13
  The bank specific aggregate price index House Pricesit is 
the weighted average of the real estate prices Pmt for each quarter t of each of the locations m in 
which the bank is located: 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑖0𝑃𝑚𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1 , and it measures the real estate 
price that affect a given bank in a given quarter across all the locations in which it operates.
14
 
We consider outcome variables ymit, which are bank policies (e.g. lending, equity issuance, 
etc.) and balance sheet items (e.g. tier 1 and tier 2 capital, etc.) defined at a bank-location-quarter 
level.  The variable may be a direct panel data variable disaggregated at a bank-location level (as 
in the case of the CRA small business loans variables) or it may be created as the product of an 
outcome variable yit defined for a bank i at time t (quarter) and a time-varying bank-location 
weight, wmit. For example, ymit may represent the loans outstanding of bank i in period t in 
location m or any other outcome variable. The weight wmit is constructed as the current fraction of 
deposits of bank i in location m with respect to the total deposits of the bank.
15
 One way to 
interpret this procedure is that if the outcome variables are, on average, proportional to the 
deposit activity of the bank, then yitwmit is a proxy of the dependent variable of the bank in a 
given location at a given point in time ymit. Alternatively, one can interpret this procedure as a 
more efficient way to estimate a bank-year level specification with multiple non-nested dummies 
for each location-year combination in which the bank operates. Note that, however, this 
specification is not equivalent to running a bank-year regression with a simple location fixed 
effect and year dummies, as locations cannot be captured by a single fixed effect and, instead, 
                                                          
13 The deposits weight captures the relative presence of each bank in each location. Although deposit and loan activity differ 
across locations we only require that deposit weights are an unbiased proxy for real estate exposure. The results are robust to 
using number of offices as the source of the static bank weights.  
14 The measure uses cross-sectional weights determined at t = 0 (fourth quarter of 2005) to avoid introducing endogeneity via the 
weighting procedure.  
15 Becker (2007) documents the segmentation of local deposit and loan markets in the US, as well as a clear causal correlation 
between deposits and loans at MSA level. Note that, even if a specific deposit weight differs from a loan weight, the only 
necessary condition for the regressions to be unbiased is that deposit weights are an unbiased measure of loan weights. In the 
Appendix we show that the results are robust to using alternative weights based on the number of offices, the amount of small 
business loans given, or simply using 1/n (where n is the number of MSAs in which the bank operates) as the weight on the left-
hand side. This is intuitive, given that in our specifications, any cross-sectional component of wmit is absorbed by the bank-
location dummies. 
14 
 
require a family of non-nested fixed effects.
 16
Note that, for some of the dependent variables 
(such as capital), using deposit weights is just a meaningful way to allocate capital proportional 
to the bank’s activity and check whether there are spillovers by comparing the aggregate effect to 
the sum of its parts. For some other variables, such as lending, there is also a local level of 
lending that we only observe for small business loans. It is not necessarily the case that deposit 
and lending activity coincide at a local level. However, it is enough to achieve consistent 
estimates that the deposit weights are an unbiased measure of lending activity, that is, that they 
do not systematically overstate or understate lending activity. We show further evidence of this 
lack of bias in the Appendix. Our results are robust to using the CRA database small business 
lending weights, or a bank’s number of offices in each location or just dividing activity equally 
across locations in the weights construction procedure. 
We use this independent variable in two specifications. The first one is a log specification. The 
second one is a level specification with an additional cross-sectional interaction that measures the 
amount of property plant and equipment (PP&E) in the bank’s balance sheet. In this second 
specification, we also replace the actual real estate prices by a prediction that only uses aggregate 
nationwide shocks and cross sectional geographical measures. Both specifications are saturated 
with time-location fixed effects and location-bank fixed effects. All the estimations are then 
performed at the bank-location-quarter level and standard errors are clustered at a bank level. 
Specification 1: Banks as portfolios of locations 
A first specification of our regressions can then be written as: 
log(𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1log(𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑚𝑖 + 𝜀𝑚𝑖𝑡         (1) 
The natural logarithm of the dependent variable 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡  (e.g., loans in a given location) is 
                                                          
16
 In particular, estimating the effect using the aggregate variables and non-nested dummies would require introducing 7380 
dummy variables (369 locations times 20 quarters). These dummies can take a positive value more than once per observation (i.e. 
banks operate in more than one location), hence they are non-nested and cannot be replicated with a combination of bank and 
location fixed effects, so they cannot be partialled out and would have to be estimated explicitly. 
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regressed against the bank-specific aggregate real estate price.
 17
  
The term 𝛿𝑚𝑡  represents a collection of time-location-specific dummy variables that should 
capture any unobserved heterogeneity that affects a given location in a given quarter. The main 
advantage of considering banks as portfolios of locations is that multi-location banks allow us to 
estimate the effect of real-estate shocks over and above the local effects captured by 𝛿𝑚𝑡 . In 
particular, these dummies should absorb any location-specific demand fluctuations. Note that the 
set of 𝛿𝑚𝑡 associated with a given location also has the implicit role of a location fixed effect. 
This implies that 𝛽1 is only identified by those banks that operate in more than one location. 
However, we include all banks in the specification, as single-location banks improve the 
precision in estimating .  
The term 𝛾𝑚𝑖 is a bank-location fixed effect. Implicit in the specification, we are assuming that 
there are local effects and bank-specific effects that are proportional to all branches of a location 
or a bank, respectively. Note that the set of 𝛾𝑚𝑖 associated with a given bank also has the implicit 
role of a bank fixed effect. 
Given that the specification is in natural logs; the term 𝛽1  measures the elasticity of the 
dependent variable (capital, different forms of lending, equity issuance and others) to real estate 
shocks, over and beyond location-time-specific and bank-specific effects. That is, the spillover 
effect above and beyond the individual impact in each of the locations in which a bank operates.. 
For example, in regard to capital losses, it is expected that the aggregate capital loss that a bank 
reports is close to the sum of the capital losses across each individual location, so 𝛽1 should be 
close to zero. However, in regard to lending, the aggregate real estate losses of a bank affect its 
local lending beyond the local lending conditions, so we expect 𝛽1 to be positive. In essence, we 
can interpret the coefficient 𝛽1 as measuring the relation between aggregate bank-specific real 
estate prices and the part of the dependent variable unexplained by local-time-varying conditions 
and pure cross-sectional (bank-MSA) conditions. A significant 𝛽1 coefficient indicates that bank 
                                                          
17 The specification in (1) can be interpreted as the reduced form of an IV specification in which price exposure is calculated 
using running weights and then instrumented with a price variable that uses fixed cross-sectional weights. 
mt
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reacts beyond what the sum of individual shocks and responses would predict and it is indicative 
of an amplification mechanism and a sufficient condition for some form of geographical 
contagion.
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Specification 2: Adding Cross-Sectional Exposures and Exogenous Price Shocks 
A second set of specifications interacts the real estate shock variable with a cross-sectional 
measure of the bank’s exposure to it, while controlling for the general impact of real estate 
shocks on all banks. This second set of regressions can be interpreted as a difference-in-
differences specification that compares banks across different real estate shocks (determined by 
their geographical presence) and different individual exposures to them (determined by their real 
estate ownership). That is, the effect is identified by comparing the different reaction of banks 
with more or less balance sheet exposure to real estate across different levels of real estate price 
shocks. The measure of balance sheet exposure to real estate shocks is related to the direct 
holdings of productive real estate by banks. The measure of individual real estate shocks is the 
same one used in the previous specification. This second specification is robust to omitted 
variables that are simultaneously correlated with the bank’s choice of the portfolio of locations 
and the outcome variable 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡, such as some forms of time-varying matching between lenders 
and borrowers. 
As a measure of real estate exposure, we use the fraction of property, plant and equipment 
(PP&E) over total assets before the beginning of the estimation sample (PP&E/Total Assets in 
2005Q4). Although it is tempting to use a bank’s real estate loans’ portfolio as a measure of the 
bank’s real estate exposure, this measure is correlated with the bank’s lending activity and thus 
introduces endogeneity in to the estimation. In unreported regressions, we show that our results 
are robust to using this alternative real estate exposure measure and remain quantitatively 
unchanged.  
                                                          
18 Furthermore, one can interpret 𝛽1 as the difference in lending (or other dependent variables) of two banks that operate in the 
same location but have different exposures to other locations. 
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Most of the banks’ PP&E of is composed of real estate holdings in the form of offices. This 
directly exposes banks to real estate fluctuations through their holdings.
19
 There are two 
characteristics that make PP&E appealing from an empirical point of view. First, although PP&E 
holdings account for a low fraction of bank assets (1.7% on average), they represent a substantial 
exposure to real estate shocks. For example, the average decrease in real estate prices in our 
sample throughout the whole period (2006Q1-2010Q4) is 35%, which would entail average 
economic capital losses of 0.6%. Given that regulatory capital in our sample is, on average, 9.2%, 
this implies a reduction in capital of approximately 6 percentage points. Second, PP&E varies 
quite a lot across banks for historical reasons or for strategic reasons unrelated to bank lending 
policies. PP&E over assets has a within-sample standard deviation of 1.7%, so banks are 
heterogeneously exposed to real estate through their PP&E for exogenous reasons, which helps 
identify the effects. 
Consider 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑃&𝐸𝑖0  as a dollar measure of the impact of real estate prices on a 
bank’s balance sheet through its PP&E holdings; where 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 measures the aggregate 
bank-level real estate price index as in the previous specification and PP&Ei0 measures the dollar 
value of the property plant and equipment of the bank at the beginning of the sample.
 20
 It is 
useful to re-write this measure as 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖0𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖0, where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖0 measures the fraction 
of PP&E in the bank’s assets at the beginning of the sample (PP&Ei0/Assetsi0). This measure 
depends on the size of the bank, so, to capture the effect of 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖0 it is essential that we add as a 
control variable the general dollar exposure of a bank to real estate prices 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖0. 
To make them comparable with the dependent variable, we re-scale both variables using the 
relative weight of each location  𝑤𝑚𝑖0 . Note that the variable of interest 
                                                          
19 PP&E is normally reflected in bank balance sheets at historical values. Banks are required to provision losses if the value of 
PP&E goes below its historical value. They also realize capital gains/losses when they sell their properties. Finally, the value of 
PP&E is implicitly taken into account whenever banks merge or go bankrupt. 
20A running exposure Expit would have the advantage of tracking the exposure of the bank more closely throughout the sample. 
However, Expit could be determined endogenously and induce biases in the estimation. Instead, we opt for a fixed Expi0, which 
may be a more imprecise proxy (especially for the later years of the sample), but it has the advantage of being predetermined. A 
similar argument can be made about the bank-location weights wmio that are determined at the beginning of the sample and kept 
constant. 
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𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖0𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖0 is composed of the interaction between the firm-specific real estate 
shock expressed in dollars 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖0 and a cross-sectional exposure measure of the 
balance sheet exposure of the bank 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖0 . Therefore the difference-in-differences structure is 
completed by including 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖0 in the regression and bank-location dummies that 
absorb the influence of 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖0.   
Therefore, the second specification takes the form: 
𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖0𝑤𝑚𝑖0 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖0𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖0𝑤𝑚𝑖0 + 𝛿𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑚𝑖 +
𝜀𝑚𝑖𝑡   (2)         
Again, we saturate the model using location-time dummies 𝛿𝑚𝑡 and bank-location dummies 
𝛾𝑚𝑖 and they have the same interpretation and in the first specification. This allows for estimating 
the effects at a bank-location-quarter level. Given that there are interactions with variables 
determined cross-sectionally at a bank level, this second specification is run in levels (dollars) 
and not logs.  
The main coefficient of interest is 𝛽2, which measures the differential impact of real estate 
prices for two banks that experience similar real estate price fluctuations in their portfolio of 
assets (i.e., the same 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖0𝑤𝑚𝑖0), but have different levels of exposure to real 
estate prices in their balance sheet. The term 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖0𝑤𝑚𝑖0 controls for the effect 
the general price fluctuations may have on the bank's policies, and as such it is an implicit control 
for bank size. In particular, it captures any bank-specific demand factors that are correlated with 
real estate price fluctuations and that affect the bank as a whole. It also captures any supply 
factors that are correlated with prices and affect all banks simultaneously, for example, a 
generalized decrease in the creditworthiness of the borrowers when the real estate prices drop. 
Note that 𝛽1 is positive by construction, as both the dependent variable and the measure of 
aggregate bank exposure are measured in dollars and related to the size of the bank, however, 𝛽2 
depends only on the effect of 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖0 (which is unitless) on this relationship.  
Again, some of our dependent variables, such as Tier 1 capital, are not explicitly allocated to 
any location. However, if one aggregates expression (2) at the bank-year level (i.e. aggregating 
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across bank-locations in a given year), the specification becomes one in which observations are 
defined at the bank-year level and we introduce fractional dummies according to the bank 
location weights and their interaction with year dummies. Note that our approach is, however, 
computationally more efficient than this equivalent specification, which would require estimating 
a large set of non-nested fixed-effect variables. The effect measured is the effect of prices when 
the bank is considered a portfolio of locations, net of the individual local effects estimated using 
the whole population of banks.  
We introduce a further modification in this last specification. We use an alternative measure of 
local real estate price variation. In this specification, we replace the actual real estate prices Pjt 
with predicted prices in regressions that use the product of local real estate price elasticities and 
the aggregate countrywide variation in prices. The real estate elasticities are constructed based on 
cross-sectional geographical data from Saiz (2010), so the predicted price, once we control for 
aggregate time effects, is not affected by the lending of banks in that particular region. Following 
Mian and Sufi (2010), Chaney et al. (2012) and Cvijanović (2014), to obtain an exogenous source 
of variation in local real estate prices, we use a measure of land supply inelasticity interacted with 
aggregate (national) real estate prices (as measured by the Case-Shiller US House Price Index) as 
our instrument for local MSA-level real estate prices.  
The intuition for this instrument is straightforward: MSAs with elastic land supply should 
experience small real estate price appreciation in response to increases in aggregate real estate 
demand (as proxied by the aggregate real estate prices), since land supply is relatively easy to 
expand. On the other hand, inelastic land supply MSAs should witness large real estate price 
appreciation in response to the same aggregate real estate demand shock (Glaeser, et. al, 2008). 21 
22As a result, the predicted real estate prices are highly correlated with the actual prices. However, 
as they are constructed by interacting a pure cross-sectional and a pure time-series variable, they 
                                                          
21 Two main factors restrict land supply. First, there may be topological constraints that impede real estate construction, such as 
steepness of terrain or presence of water bodies. Two, regulation plays an important role in restricting land development and new 
construction. Environmental regulation, urban planning, and zoning are just a few issues that restrict the amount of land supply. 
22 Glaeser et al. (2008) and Hilber and Vermeulen (2014) also provide evidence that the level of mean-reversion in house prices 
was enormous in highly inelastic places during the 1989–1996 period in the U.S., that is during 1974–1977, 1981–1982, 1990–
1996 and in 2008 in the UK, thus providing further justification for using the instrument. 
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are not driven by temporary location-specific shocks or by the feedback from local lending to real 
estate prices. For this same reason, we estimate this second specification in levels, as a log 
structure with time-location and bank-location fixed effects would absorb all the relevant 
variation. 
The specification in Equation (1) would have a similar interpretation as some of the 
conglomerates literature that estimates the reaction of one division to exogenous shocks to 
another division (see, for example, Lamont and Polk 2002; and Chang and Dasgupta 2007; 
among others). More closely related is the work by Murfin (2012), Gilje et al (2016) and 
Chakraborty et al. (2016), who also isolate the effects of shocks in a given location on bank 
outcomes in other locations.
23
 By adding a further interaction with the level of cross-sectional 
exposure of the bank to real estate shocks in Equation (2), the effect is identified by banks with 
the same aggregate shocks but with different exposure to them. 
4 Results 
Using the two proposed specifications, we provide evidence of the internal contagion of real 
estate shocks within banks both across geographical areas of operations and across business 
divisions. 
We proceed by stages: In section 4.1 we start by documenting the impact of real estate shocks 
on the capital of banks. Section 4.2 focuses on total lending as well as lending to small 
businesses, where for the latter variable, we have an exact geographical identification down to the 
census tract level. These first two sections show some first-order effects of real estate shock on 
bank policies and also provide auxiliary results to establish the validity of our estimation strategy. 
Our main results are shown in Sections 4.3 to Section 4.5. In particular, section 4.3 studies the 
disaggregated effects on different types of loans, showing how banks adjust their portfolio of 
loans. Section 4.4 discusses how banks address problematic loans when faced with a real-estate-
                                                          
23 More specifically, Murfin (2012) focuses on unexpected liquidity shocks, Gilje et. al. (2016) on oil and natural gas shale 
discoveries and Chakraborty et al. (2016) on the rise in real estate prices during the housing bubble. Our identification strategy 
can also be seen as the mirror image of that in Ashcraft and Campello (2007). While they aim to isolate local effects, controlling 
for bank-aggregate effects, our objective is exactly the opposite. 
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induced loss. In Section 4.5, we explore how real estate losses are transmitted to a bank’s other 
business areas. Finally, in Section 4.6, we explore the cross-sectional heterogeneity in banks’ 
responses to real estate market shocks in terms of their size. 
4.1 Capital  
In this section, we start by providing motivating evidence that confirms the findings of the 
existing literature on the effects of exogenous shocks on banks’ balance sheets (Gilje et al. 2016; 
Chakraborty et al. 2016). We begin by exploring the effect of real estate shocks on bank’s capital 
the two different proposed specifications. Panel A of Table 2 shows the results of a log 
specification that measures elasticities (see Equation (1)), while Panel B shows a specification in 
levels in which the exposure of banks to real estate loans is measured using their property plant 
and equipment (PP&E) and with instrumented real estate prices (along the lines of Equation (2)).  
In Column 1 and 2 of panel A, the point estimates indicate that that a 10% reduction in real 
estate prices reduces, on average, Tier 1 capital by 1.4% relative to itself. This is a modest 
reduction in capital, and it is not statistically significant. This is an interesting result. The 
coefficient on log(𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡)  in specification 1 can be interpreted as the effect of the 
aggregate bank-specific real estate shock over and above what the sum of the individual local 
effects predict. The result show that the sum of the local capital losses is a good predictor of the 
aggregate capital reduction reported by the bank. That is, there is no evidence of capital savings 
through diversification across geographical regions (that would imply a negative coefficient on 
log(𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡), nor a strong sign of an amplification effect, given the small positive point 
estimate and the lack of statistical significance. This is an intuitive result, as capital losses are 
likely to be additive. If a bank recognizes a capital loss in one location, it does not affect the way 
in which the bank needs to calculate capital losses in a different location. Similarly, the effects on 
Tier 2 capital are not significant in the first panel.  
 The results in Panel B show capital losses across banks with different levels of real estate 
ownership. The estimation captures the fact that banks with more PP&E in their balance sheet 
should recognize higher capital losses when facing real estate shocks. This is because the PP&E 
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exposure measure generates cross-sectional heterogeneity that is not captured by the location 
composition of a bank. The resulting coefficients are positive and significant for both Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 capital. As expected, banks with a higher cross-sectional exposure to real-estate prices 
recognize a larger fraction of capital losses. The quantitative impact of the effect can be 
interpreted as 3 cents of Tier 1 capital depleted per dollar of real estate losses, although, again, 
these have to be interpreted as over and above the common losses that other banks in the same 
MSA report. This second set of results is important to validate the use of PP&E as a useful 
measure of real estate exposure. Although the direct economic impact of real estate prices on the 
creditworthiness of a bank via its real estate holdings is mechanical, it is also important to 
establish whether banks are able to offset this impact and whether they actually recognize it from 
an accounting point of view. Comparing two banks with the same real estate shock, the one with 
a higher exposure to PP&E  recognizes higher losses. These may be due to realized capital gains 
when real estate is sold or to loss recognition when the value of real estate assets is below its 
historical purchase value. 
Overall, this section presents several preliminary results for the rest of the paper. First, overall 
capital losses of banks seem to be aligned with what the local effects predict. However, banks 
with a higher exposure to real estate shocks through their PP&E do recognize higher losses than 
those less exposed.  
4.2 Total Loans 
Following the previous evidence regarding the significant capital losses banks experienced 
following negative shocks (see also Cortes and Strahan 2015), we next examine the effects on 
banks’ overall lending policies. Namely, we estimate the effect of real estate market spillovers on 
bank "branch" lending. Column 3 in Panel A of Table 2 shows the results with respect to total 
lending. A positive coefficient indicates a reduction in total lending when real estate prices drop. 
Effects are measured over and above the sum of the MSA-quarter effects predicted by other 
banks. The effect is statistically significant; an additional 10% drop in the portfolio of real estate 
locations of a bank reduces the flow of small business loans by 1.8% over and above the local 
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reduction by other banks. This suggests that there is an overall balance sheet amplification 
mechanism of real estate shocks in our sample. It is important to establish the existence of this 
amplification for the particular shock and channel in this paper before approaching a more 
detailed analysis of the transmission across business lines and different types on lending.  
In Column 3 of Panel B of Table 2 we report the results regarding total lending for the 
difference in differences specification. Here the results focus on the heterogeneous exposure of 
banks to real estate for a given combination of regions. The results show that banks that are more 
exposed to real estate shocks through their own real estate ownership also cut loans more 
intensely
24
. 
To further establish the validity of the proposed channel, we explore the effect of real estate 
prices on small business loans. This is shown in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2. The dependent 
variables in these specifications are obtained from the CRA database and are measured directly at 
a local level rather than constructed using dynamic weights. The results using this alternative 
source of data are also positive and significant and are very consistent with the results that use an 
imputed dependent variable using deposit weights. The effect is, in fact, larger in terms of 
elasticities than for the total loans variable. A reduction of 10% in real estate prices implies a 
reduction in small business loans of 7% relative to themselves. This result is important to validate 
the rest of the analysis in the paper, as it establishes that there is geographical contagion across 
regions in bank lending. This is a sustained assumption throughout the rest of the paper. 
Summing up, this section shows that total lending is reduced due to aggregate real estate 
losses over and above the local effects that affect all banks. This is suggestive of contagion across 
geographical regions, but we also check this contagion using data on small business loans. 
Finally the loan reduction is more intense for those banks more exposed to shocks via their PP&E 
holdings. These results are in line with Gan (2007) and Loutskina and Strahan (2015), who also 
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 During the 2006-10 period, there has been a significant M&A activity in the banking sector. There were also more than 300 
bank failures during this time. To address the concern that not including bank failures might underestimate our results, we also 
estimate our main specifications while dropping the bank*MSA fixed effects, as if every bank was re-born every period. As it can 
be seen from the Appendix, our results remain unchanged. 
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show a transmission of real estate shocks throughout the balance sheet of banks. In our 
application, we are able to extend this idea to the whole population of US banks during the crisis 
using an estimation strategy that is reminiscent of the conglomerates literature. Following this 
intuition, in the next section, we explore the contagion of real estate shocks across different loan 
types. 
4.3 Loan Portfolio 
In the previous section, we showed evidence of an overall a drop in lending that ensued when 
the real estate market collapsed. In the following few paragraphs, we investigate whether this 
effect was felt across different types of loans. This is an important objective, as it would indicate 
a form of transmission of real estate shocks across business areas that occurs through the balance 
sheet of banks.  The results of this section are intuitively linked to the problem of how to 
optimally downsize a portfolio of investments, taking into account the liquidation costs and the 
reversibility of this downsizing. They are also related to the literature on internal capital markets 
and how firms allocate funds across divisions. 
Table 3 shows disaggregated results for different types of loans. By looking at the results 
presented in Panel A, we can see that the real estate market collapse had a ripple effect on various 
types of lending at the bank "branch" level. We decompose total lending into Real Estate Loans, 
Loans to Depositors, Agricultural Loans, Commercial and Industrial Loans, Foreign Loans, 
Obligations, Loans to non-Depositors and Leases. These are mutually exclusive categories used 
in the CALL reports that together comprise the total loans variable.  
The results show that banks reduce their lending across different types of loans, although the 
effects are not homogeneous across all categories. In the log specification (Panel A), the riskier 
forms of lending (unsecured loans to depositors and commercial loans) are the most affected. A 
reduction of real estate prices of 10% implies a reduction of loans to depositors of 10% and a 
reduction in commercial loans of 7%. Real estate loans are also affected, but to a lower extent, 
with a reduction of 3% associated with a 10% reduction in real estate prices. Other loan 
categories, such as agricultural loans, leases, loans to foreign institutions and any other types of 
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loans, show elasticities that are not statistically different from zero. Optimally downsizing a 
portfolio of loans involves taking into account transaction costs and the reversibility and price 
elasticities of the different types of loans among other variables. The fact that some lending 
categories are being cut more severely than real estate loans as a result of a real estate shock 
reflects the results of this optimization. 
The results for the difference-in-difference specification (Specification (2)) shown in Panel B 
are largely consistent with the previous results. In overall dollar terms, real estate loans are the 
most affected category, followed by commercial and industrial loans and individual loans. 
However, the relative size of each of these categories in the balance sheet of banks is not 
homogeneous, so one needs to rescale the effect accordingly (see Panel C in Table 1). In relative 
terms, commercial and industrial loans and loans to depositors are again the most affected. Loans 
to non-depositors which are mostly interbank loans are also highly affected, in relative terms, in 
this second specification.  
These results draw a picture of how economic shocks are transmitted through the banking 
system back to the real economy. By construction, our paper establishes the contagion of shocks 
across geographical locations via banks; this is at the heart of our identification strategy. This 
section also indicates a channel of contagion and amplification within the different business areas 
of a bank.
25
 Given that we measure the real estate shocks at the aggregate bank level, our 
specifications allow for the real estate shocks to be transmitted from one bank location to another. 
The results shown in Table 3 indicate that there is both a geographical transmission effect and a 
spillover of the real estate shock from one banking business area (i.e., real estate) to another (i.e., 
loans to other depository institutions, personal loans, commercial and industrial lending or 
consumer loans).  
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 This result resembles similar effects in the literature of internal capital markets (see, for example, Lamont and Polk 2002; or, 
more recently, Matvos and Seru 2013). It also contrasts with the results in Chakraborty et al. (2016), who find a substitution effect 
across bank business lines during the real estate boom. However, both results are mutually consistent with standard financing 
constraint models, in which firms are constrained either when their investment opportunities expand beyond their financing 
capabilities (as in Chakraborty et al. 2016) or when their financing capabilities shrink faster than their investment opportunities 
(our results). In both situations, non-real estate loans are expected to shrink. 
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A consistent pattern appears across all these analyses: deleveraging banks reduce interbank 
and commercial/industrial lending significantly. The common understanding is that interbank 
loans are the most liquid and less relationship-based, while commercial/industrial loans are the 
most risky. This is consistent with the existing literature on constrained financial institutions’ 
investment decisions to sell the most-liquid assets first to raise capital and then cut down risk 
exposure by lowering the holdings of the most-risky assets. 
4.4 Loss Recognition 
In this section, we measure how affected banks address problematic loans when they are more 
affected by real estate losses. While the real economic impact of real estate prices on mortgages 
is determined by their exposure to real estate and real estate prices, banks may have an incentive 
to manipulate or time the apparent losses they recognize from an accounting and regulatory point 
of view. By rolling over loans with dubious prospects of repayment, banks can postpone the 
recognition of losses from an accounting point of view as well as gamble on the improvement of 
the loans’ repayment odds. Conversely, by foreclosing and liquidating some loans early, banks 
can provide themselves with additional liquidity. Banks also have some flexibility with respect to 
which particular loans they liquidate and which ones they keep as non-performing loans in their 
balance sheets. Table 4 shows the effects on loss recognition, loan recoveries and non-performing 
loans. 
The first results in Columns 1, 2 and 3 of Panel A of Table 4 show how banks that are more 
affected by real estate prices, perform less charge offs and less loan recoveries than what is 
predicted by the sum of their parts. Overall, the effect on net recoveries is also negative. 
Moreover, in columns 1 to 7 of Panel B of Table 4, the results show that more affected banks are 
also having higher levels of non-performing loans. Given that these effects are in addition to the 
local effects and are related to the overall bank losses, this result indicates that affected banks 
were postponing the recognition of losses and not tidying up their balance sheet, even in locations 
in which they were not directly affected. This behavior is similar to the documented “zombie” 
lending activities of banks during the Japanese banking crisis, as documented by Caballero et al. 
27 
 
(2008).  
As we can see from Panel B, banks particularly increase the total amount of outstanding non-
performing loans (Column 1). Moreover, this increase is felt substantially across different loan 
categories, such as commercial and industrial non-performing loans (Column 2) and commercial 
real estate loans (Column 6), indicating that the effort to recognize less losses is done across 
business lines and is not restricted to new policies relative to mortgage lending. Jointly, these two 
effects show that the more-affected banks are rolling-over more dubious loans instead of pushing 
for an earlier resolution that would imply recognizing some losses, but which would also 
generate additional liquidity. 
The first results in Columns 4, 5 and 6 of Panel A of Table 4 show a slightly different picture. 
Banks that are more exposed to real estate prices in the cross section, over-react to real estate 
prices when it comes to loan recoveries and charge-offs. That is, they recover more loans and 
recognize more losses. As we show in Table 2, these are precisely the banks that suffer higher 
capital losses. This is consistent with a notion of more capital constrained banks recognizing 
more losses so as to alleviate uncertainty about their future capital requirements. The results in 
Panel C are consistent with those in Panel B, showing that more affected banks in the cross-
section also have more non-performing loans (Column 1, Panel C). Jointly, the results on this 
second specification provide a mixed picture. While it seems that more affected banks are 
managing their capital losses more actively, they are also accumulating more non-performing 
loans. Note that these two results are not mutually exclusive, since banks have some flexibility in 
determining non-performing loans and in choosing the quality of the loans that they decide to 
foreclose. In particular, these results imply that more affected banks are postponing the 
liquidation of higher quality loans, but liquidating more actively the lower quality ones. 
The evidence in the previous two sections jointly indicates that banks that are more affected 
by real estate shocks in given locations take actions in their overall business portfolio that allow 
them to postpone the recognition of losses and the need for additional capital. Our results suggest 
that banks buy time and obfuscate their losses by managing their problematic loans. More 
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affected banks are more likely to accumulate non-performing loans and, in relative terms, are less 
likely to liquidate them and recognize losses. Our results are in line with the existing evidence 
that suggests that such “zombie lending” took place in Japan during the 1990s (Peek and 
Rosengren 2005; Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita 2003; Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap 2008). 
While we cannot directly observe the impact of these actions on bank profits, it is reasonable to 
conjecture that some of these policies are efforts to increase liquidity and current cash flows at 
the expense of future and aggregate discounted profits and that they may destroy value.
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4.5 Cost Reductions, Equity Issuance and Liquidity 
In the previous sections, we have shown that in response to negative shocks to the value of 
their productive real estate (and their portfolios of real estate loans), banks experienced 
substantial capital losses that were followed by a significant cut in their aggregate lending. This 
shock had a ripple effect on bank business operations that involve the real estate sector, and the 
shock was transmitted to other banks’ business operations. An advantage of our estimation 
strategy, relative to the state of the art within-firm estimators is that we can focus on bank 
outcomes other than lending. In this section, we explore the effects of real estate shocks in the 
funding and operational decisions of banks. 
We start by focusing on equity issuance (Column 1 in Table 5). More affected banks do not 
seem to have accessed equity markets more intensely. Both Panel A and B show small and 
statistically insignificant results. 
The next set of results (Columns 2 to 4) focuses on several measures of operational expenses. 
The results on PPE exposure show that more-affected banks reduce their operational expenses at 
different levels of aggregation: expenses on premises, interest expenses, and non-interest 
expenses. The effect is also very large when we pool interest and non-interest expenses. Even 
though the decrease in creditworthiness may increase the per unit cost of borrowing of banks, 
more affected banks managed to cut their borrowing needs in line with their reduction in loans. 
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 See Garicano and Steinwender (2013) for a detailed analysis of similar policies at a firm level. 
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The elasticity results are more imprecisely estimated and only show statistically significant 
results when we pool all the interest and non-interest expenditures together. 
Finally, we show results on the different liquid assets that banks keep (Columns 5 to 7). 
Again, only the relative exposure specification shows positive and statistically significant results. 
Positive coefficients in all of them indicate a reduction in these liquid assets. That is, banks are 
selling some of their liquid assets to create liquidity that helps them address their real estate 
losses.  
Overall, the results in Table 5 show a general inability of more-affected banks to replenish 
core capital with the additional issuance of equity. Moreover, more-affected banks reduce their 
operational costs and deplete their liquidity as part of their effort to address real estate shocks.  
4.6 The Case of Large Banks 
In this section, we explore the cross-sectional heterogeneity in banks’ responses to the real 
estate market collapse in terms of their size. For example, the top 5 banks in the US have 40% of 
deposits nationwide and the top 20 US banks (bank holding companies - BHCs) hold assets equal 
to 84.5% of the nation’s entire economic output. Large banks are also the ones with more 
diversified geographical portfolios. It is important to examine these banks separately to assess 
which part of our results is driven by the largest banks in the economy. 
To identify the "mega banks" in our sample, we rank them in Q42005 based on their total 
assets. The top 99th percentile contains the 20 largest banks (BHCs).27 For each bank-location 
combination ("branch"), we then assign a value of 1 for the dummy variable LARGE if its parent 
holder (BHC) is one of the top 20 BHCs listed above. We interact the variable LARGE with the 
variables of the specification in (2). 
The results are shown in Table 6. Column 1 of Panel B shows the results for tier 1 capital. We 
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 These are, in in descending order: JPMorgan Chase & Co, Bank of America Corporation, Citigroup Inc., Wells Fargo & 
Company, Goldman Sachs Group, Morgan Stanley, US Bancorp, Bank of New York Mellon, HSBC North America Holdings, 
PNC Financial Services Group, Capital One, TD Bank US Holding Company, State Street Corporation, Ally Financial, BB&T 
Corporation, Suntrust Banks, Principal Financial Group, American Express Company, Ameriprise Financial and RBS Citizens 
Financial Group. 
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can see that the estimated coefficient on the interaction term (β4) is negative but very small and 
not statistically significant. In Column 2, we see a different effect for large banks in terms of tier 
2 capital depletion that is only significant in the log specification (Panel A), reducing the impact 
by 15%.  
The specification in Column 3 measures the effect on total lending and shows a slightly 
different picture. A large negative coefficient indicates that large banks were able to cut loans 
proportionally less than smaller banks. The effect is 26% of the size of the general effect. This is 
an interesting result: while the qualitative result is the same for both large and small banks, it 
seems that the transmission of shocks via lending for large banks is much smaller than for small 
banks. The smaller overall effect for large banks is important, given the trend toward a more 
concentrated banking market nationwide.  
One possible interpretation of the relatively smaller effect on lending for large banks could be 
that larger banks are also ones that are moving away from the originate and distribute mortgage 
business and are returning to a more traditional on balance sheet business. However, the results 
in Table 3 seem to go against this hypothesis. The relatively lower reduction in lending operates 
across all business lines and is not restricted to real estate lending. Another possible interpretation 
is that large banks had better access to equity markets. In Column 3, we explore the differences in 
equity issuance across bank sizes. The result is both economically and statistically non-
significant, so it does not seem that equity issuance is an important factor in the relatively smaller 
effect found in larger banks. A third possible interpretation is that large banks are able to better 
distribute the negative shocks across more locations, thus having a lower amplification effect 
than more concentrated multi-location banks. 
Overall, the results in this section do not show important qualitative differences between large 
banks and the rest. Quantitatively, large banks exhibit a slightly smaller sensitivity to real estate 
shocks. These results suggest that the nature of the real estate market price depreciation 
transmission on bank financing, operating and payout policy decisions was not qualitatively 
driven by their relative size differences. However, quantitatively, this combination of results 
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shows that the consolidation of banks in the US has potentially contributed to a more resilient 
banking system. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the effects of real estate price declines on banks’ loan product 
portfolio and on the role the mismanaged bank lending during the recent crisis played in 
prolonging the economic stagnation. We investigate how the real estate shocks that triggered the 
most recent financial crisis affected the composition of the banks’ loan portfolio, both in terms of 
the type of products on offer, and in terms of their solvency. We find that in response to real 
estate price declines, banks substantially altered their loan portfolios: not only did they 
significantly reduce their real estate related lending, but these cuts also spilt over across business 
lines, including types of lending that are not directly related to real estate. We find significant 
effects on the treatment of existing loans: more affected banks continued to bet on the 
resurrection of their insolvent loans during the last crisis. Following real estate price declines, 
banks opted to roll over loans more frequently, recognize fewer losses and liquidate fewer loans, 
accumulating more non-performing loans. 
Using the geographical coverage of banks, we consider each bank as a portfolio of real-estate 
locations; this enables us to identify the effect of real estate losses on their lending and balance 
sheets, while controlling for local conditions in a given point in time. Our approach implicitly 
compares the total bank-level effect of a balance sheet shock with the one that would result by 
adding up the individual local effects. More specifically, we measure how the aggregate exposure 
of a bank to real estate shocks affects its policies over and above the sum of the local effects 
predicted by other banks present in the same locations. Using this strategy we find evidence of 
balance sheet amplification effects for a broad population of firms (banks) during a long period of 
time (the real estate crisis). 
The results are important to understand how banks address shocks that deplete their regulatory 
and economic capital. Some of the results show a transmission mechanism through bank lending 
to final borrowers and transmission mechanisms across locations and within banks. Banks 
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operating in multiple locations and business areas can be a source of economic resiliency by 
diversifying the impact of economic shocks. However, we also show that their overall reaction is 
amplified beyond the sum of their individual parts in several dimensions and that they can be a 
source of contagion.  
The reaction of banks’ internal capital markets to real estate shocks is also relevant to the 
macroeconomic transmission of shocks. On the one hand, the internal contagion of shocks within 
the banks is related to the geographic transmission of economic shocks. A recent stream of recent 
explores the geographic transmission of shocks in the US economy (Caliendo et al. (2016), Fogli 
et al. (2013)). This research documents important regional linkages in the US, but it is still a 
challenge to identify the specific channels through which regions influence each other. Our 
results can be seen as suggestive of banks as one of the possible channels of such contagion. On 
the other hand, even if we observe contagion and a certain degree of amplification within a bank, 
this could actually make the whole economy more resilient. To the extent that banks are able to 
absorb local losses by transferring their effects to less affected locations, they are smoothing local 
shocks and making themselves more resilient. This additional resiliency has a geographical 
dimension, but it is also present when we analyze banks as a conglomerate of business lines. 
Focusing on the whole population of US banks during a financial crisis with a marked real estate 
component is particularly relevant to understand this resiliency. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1  
CBSA Real Estate Price Growth 2005–2011 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of the sample of bank holding companies, obtained from Call Reports, merged 
with the geographical distribution of bank deposits as obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). House prices are obtained from the Federal Housing Finance Association (FHFA). Our sample consists of 
quarterly data on all deposit-insured commercial banks. We include only bank-quarter observations with non-missing 
information on total assets, total loans, and equity. The data cover the period spanning from the first quarter of 2005 
to the last quarter of 2010. 
 
Panel A: Bank summary statistics (as of Q42005) 
 
  mean sd p25 p50 p75 
Total Assets 107,000,000 271,000,000 159,986 723,580 36,300,000 
Total Loans 57,600,000 134,000,000 110,145 494,696 25,100,000 
MBS 13,700,000 41,100,000 2,037 39,248 3,002,975 
PP&E 841,408 1,934,679 2,890 12,304 411,273 
Total Equity Capital 10,100,000 24,900,000 16,086 69,927 3,563,262 
Tier 1 Capital 6,778,542 17,000,000 15,527 66,208 2,151,723 
Tier 2 Capital 2,185,870 5,197,550 1,215 6,314 577,367 
 
Panel B: Bank summary statistics, scaled by total assets (as of Q42005) 
 
  mean sd p25 p50 p75 
Total Loans 0.669 0.150 0.599 0.691 0.762 
MBS 0.081 0.084 0.01 0.062 0.125 
PP&E 0.017 0.014 0.008 0.013 0.022 
Total Equity Capital 0.109 0.073 0.083 0.095 0.111 
Tier 1 Capital 0.092 0.058 0.067 0.081 0.096 
Tier 2 Capital 0.013 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.015 
 
Panel C: Types of lending 
 
 Scaled by total assets 
 
Real estate 
loans 
Loans to 
depository inst. 
Agri loans 
Commercia
l & 
industrial 
loans 
Individual 
loans 
Foreign 
loans 
Obligations 
Loans to 
non-
depository 
inst. 
Leases  
Mean 0.4666 0.0033 0.0096 0.0765 0.0555 0.0001 0.0045 0.0082 0.0075  
 
 
Scaled by total lending 
 
Real estate 
loans 
Loans to 
depository inst. 
Agri loans 
Commercia
l &  
industrial 
loans 
Individual 
loans 
Foreign 
loans 
Obligations 
Loans to 
non-
depository 
inst. 
Leases  
Mean 0.6883 0.0071 0.0150 0.1169 0.0862 0.0001 0.0074 0.0145 0.0114  
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Panel D: Real estate price summary statistics 
 
  Mean SD Min p25 p50 p75 Max 
Case-Shiller US house price 
index 
162.68 22.61 130.84 135.98 170.49 186.26 190.5 
MSA House Prices Index 186.43 39.84 114.94 159.14 175.01 200.14 365.1 
Inelasticity 2.93 0.88 1 2.29 2.7 3.76  4.4 
 
Panel E: Bank location summary statistics 
 
By bank-MSA Avg number of MSAs Median number of MSAs 
Whole sample 29.8  2  
Single-MSA banks 1 1 
Multi-MSA banks 49.9 17 
By bank   
Whole sample 1.97 1 
Single-MSA banks 1 1 
Multi-MSA banks 6.22 2 
   
 Unique bank-MSA-date Total Observations (bank-MSA-date) 
Whole sample 2,435 98,497 
Single-MSA banks 1968 40,595 
Multi-MSA banks 487 57,902 
   
Avg MSA weight 0.448  
Median MSA weight 0.198  
 
 
Panel F: Bank-specific aggregate real estate price index House Pricesit 
  House Pricesit   
By bank, across 
quarters 
Avg Single-
MSA 
Demeaned Single-MSA Avg Multi-MSA 
Demeaned Multi-
MSA 
mean 220.70 -6.03x10
-7
 227.31 -5.01 x10
-6
 
sd 49.84 27.87954 34.90 26.31 
     
     By quarter, across 
banks 
Avg Single-
MSA 
Demeaned Single-MSA Avg Multi-MSA 
Demeaned Multi-
MSA 
mean 220.7 2.17 x10
-6
 227.32 1.40 x10
-6
 
sd 0.67 57.11 0.71 43.71 
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Table 2: The effect of real estate prices on bank capital and lending policies  
 
Panel A shows the results of estimating the log specification as in Equation (1), while Panel B shows the results of 
estimating Equation (2). The dependent variables ymit are obtained from the FDIC call reports and CRA small 
business loans. From FDIC call reports we obtain: tier 1 capital (RCFD8274), total loans (RCFD2122), tier 2 capital 
(RCFD8275). From the CRA small business loans data set we obtain the total originated and purchased small 
business loans and total originated small business loans. Dependent variables ymit are defined at a bank-location-
quarter level that is created as the product of an outcome variable yit defined for bank i at time t (quarter) and a time-
varying bank-location weight, wmit. For example, ymit may represent the loans outstanding of bank i in period t in 
location m or any other outcome variable. The weight wmit is constructed as the fraction of deposits of bank i in 
location m with respect to the total deposits of the bank. The independent variable in Panel A, Log(House Pricesit), is 
the main independent variable that captures the real estate shock that a given bank is facing. It can be written as 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑖0𝑃𝑚𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1  It measures the weighted average of the real estate prices Pmt of each of the 
locations in which the bank is located, using as weights the relative importance of each location in terms of deposits 
(wim0 is a static weight at t0). In Panel B, Pmt (local MSA-level real estate price) is predicted using land supply 
inelasticity interacted with aggregate (national) real estate prices (as measured by the Case-Shiller US House Price 
Index). All specifications include bank-MSA and MSA-quarter fixed effects. In all specifications, we report robust 
standard errors that cluster at the bank level. 
 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All dep. variables in logs 
Tier 1 
Capital 
Tier 2 
Capital 
Loans 
Total Loans 
(Originated + 
Purchased) 
Total Loans 
(Originated) 
            
      
Log(House Pricesit) 0.144 -0.061 0.185* 0.689* 0.708* 
 (1.30) (-0.40) (1.65) (1.72) (1.72) 
      
Bank*MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Obs 97,565 97,048 97,239 15,683 15,683 
R
2
 0.674 0.787 0.712 0.782 0.802 
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Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Tier 1 
Capital 
Tier 2 
Capital 
Loans 
Total Loans 
(Originated + 
Purchased) 
Total Loans 
(Originated) 
      
House Pricesit * 
PP&Ebranch,2005 0.031*** 0.013*** 0.254*** 2.184*** 2.187*** 
 (14.06) (9.87) (6.61) (3.30) (3.30) 
      
Bank*MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Obs 95,987 95,987 95,987 15,683 15,683 
R
2
 0.699 0.707 0.714 0.513 0.512 
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Table 3: The effect of real estate prices on banks’ loan composition 
Panel A shows the results of estimating the log specification as in Equation (1), while Panel B shows the results of estimating 
Equation (2). The dependent variables ymit are: real estate loans (RCFD1410), loans to depository institutions and acceptances 
of other banks, agricultural and farmers loans (RCFD1590), commercial and industrial loans, individual loans (RCFD1975), 
loans to foreign governments and official institutions (including foreign central banks), obligations (other than securities and 
leases) of states and political subdivisions in the U.S., and lease financing receivables (RCON2165). Dependent variable ymit is 
defined at a bank-location level that is created as the product of an outcome variable yit defined for bank i at time t (quarter) and 
a time-varying bank-location weight, wmit. The independent variable in Panel A, Log(House Pricesit), is the main independent 
variable that captures the real estate shock that a given bank is facing. It can be written as 
 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑖0𝑃𝑚𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1 . It 
measures the weighted average of the real estate prices Pmt of each of the locations in which the bank is located, using as 
weights the relative importance of each location in terms of deposits (wim0 is a static weight at t0). In Panel B, Pmt (local MSA-
level real estate price) is predicted using land supply inelasticity interacted with aggregate (national) real estate prices (as 
measured by the Case-Shiller US House Price Index). All specifications include bank-MSA and MSA-quarter fixed effects. In 
all specifications, we report robust standard errors that cluster at the bank level. 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
All dep. variables in 
logs 
ReLoans 
LoansTo
Dep 
AgriLoans CILoans 
Individual 
Loans 
Foreign Loans Obligations 
Loans-
NonDep 
Leases 
                    
Log(House Pricesit) 0.313*** 1.012** 0.281 0.703*** 0.075 0.455 -0.265 -0.135 0.241 
 (3.63) (1.98) (1.63) (2.98) (0.66) (1.30) (-1.59) (-0.67) (0.81) 
          
Bank*MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Obs 92,202 92,202 92,202 92,202 92,202 92,202 92,202 92,202 92,202 
R2 0.970 0.937 0.947 0.942 0.964 0.874 0.938 0.916 0.966 
Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
ReLoans 
LoansTo
Dep 
AgriLoans CILoans 
Individual 
Loans 
Foreign 
Loans 
Obligations Loans-NonDep Leases 
House Pricesit * PP&Ebranch,2005 0.142*** 0.006*** 0.001** 0.054*** 0.029*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 
 (5.27) (4.07) (2.33) (7.10) (11.72) (4.38) (3.95) (4.81) (3.00) 
          
Bank*MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Obs 90,356 90,356 90,356 90,356 90,356 90,356 90,356 90,356 90,356 
R2 0.727 0.057 0.342 0.699 0.101 0.120 0.463 0.662 0.531 
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Table 4: The effect of real estate prices on loan loss recognition, recoveries and non-performing loans 
 
In Panel A, we report estimation results of Equation (2) in columns 1 and 2, and estimation results of Equation (1) in columns 3 
and 4. The dependent variables ymit in Panel A are: loan recoveries (RIAD4605), loan charge offs (RIAD4635) and net charge 
offs, defined as the difference between loan recoveries and loan charge offs. In Panels B and C, we show the results for total 
non-performing loans (defined as the sum of total loans past due 90 days or more and non-accruals). We split them by type of 
non-performing loans: commercial and industrial non-performing loans, farmer non-performing loans, restructured non-
performing loans, other non-performing bank assets, commercial real estate non-performing loans, and credit card non-
performing loans. Panel B shows the results of estimating Equation (1), and Panel C shows the results of estimating Equation 
(2). Dependent variable ymit is defined at a bank-location level that is created as the product of an outcome variable yit defined 
for bank i at time t (quarter) and a time-varying bank-location weight, wmit. The weight wmit is constructed as the fraction of 
deposits of bank i in location m with respect to the total deposits of the bank. The independent variable in Panel B, Log(House 
Pricesit), is the main independent variable that captures the real estate shock that a given bank is facing. It can be written as 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑖0𝑃𝑚𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1 . It measures the weighted average of the real estate prices Pmt of each of the locations in 
which the bank is located, using as weights the relative importance of each location in terms of deposits (wim0 is a static weight 
at t0). In Panel A and Panel C, Pmt (local MSA-level real estate price) is predicted using land supply inelasticity interacted with 
aggregate (national) real estate prices (as measured by the Case-Shiller US House Price Index). All specifications include bank-
MSA and MSA-quarter fixed effects. In all specifications, we report robust standard errors that cluster at the bank level. 
 
 
Panel A 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
log(Loan 
recoveries) 
log(Loan 
charge offs) 
log(Net charge 
offs) 
Loan 
recoveries 
Loan 
charge offs 
Net charge 
offs 
Log(House Pricesit) 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.001***    
 (5.81) (6.17) (6.11)    
House Pricesit * 
PP&Ebranch,2005    -0.364** -1.709*** -2.083*** 
    (-1.97) (-5.63) (-6.50) 
 
      
Bank*MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Obs 97,969 97,969 91,362 95,987 95,987 95,987 
R
2
 0.879 0.858 0.855 0.647 0.443 0.412 
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Panel B 
  Non-performing loans by type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
All dep. variables in 
logs 
Non-
performing 
loans 
Commercial 
and 
Industrial 
Farmer 
Restructured 
loans 
Other non-
performing 
assets 
Commercial 
real estate 
Credit 
card 
         
Log(House Pricesit) -2.365*** -1.686*** -2.171*** -5.633*** -2.059*** -2.996*** -0.687* 
 (-6.76) (-4.96) (-2.60) (-6.79) (-5.21) (-4.68) (-1.65) 
        
Bank*MSA fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Obs 97,930 97,969 97,969 97,924 97,969 97,969 97,889 
R
2
 0.785 0.974 0.774 0.713 0.917 0.825 0.776 
 
Panel C 
  Non-performing loans by type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Non-
performing 
loans 
Commercial 
and 
Industrial 
Farmer 
Restructured 
loans 
Other non-
performing 
assets 
Commercial 
real estate 
Credit 
card 
        
House Pricesit * PP&Ebranch,2005 -0.006** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.003 
 (-2.12) (-2.88) (-0.63) (-4.14) (-2.00) (-3.67) (-1.37) 
        
Bank*MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Obs 95,987 95,987 95,987 95,987 95,987 95,987 95,987 
R
2
 0.072 0.021 0.063 0.061 -0.024 0.091 0.036 
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Table 5: The effect of real estate prices on banks’ financing and operating activities. 
Panel A shows the results of estimating the log specification as in Equation (1), while Panel B shows the results of estimating 
Equation (2). The dependent variables ymit are: equity issuance (defined as the quarterly change in tier 1 capital), expenses on 
premises (RIAD4217), non-interest expense (RIAD4093), interest and non-interest expense (RIAD4130), trading assets 
(RCFD3545), investment securities (RCFD0391) and cash and balances (RCFD0010). Dependent variable ymit is defined at a 
bank-location level that is created as the product of an outcome variable yit defined for bank i at time t (quarter) and a time-
varying bank-location weight, wmit. The weight wmit is constructed as the fraction of deposits of bank i in location m with 
respect to the total deposits of the bank. The independent variable in Panel A, Log(House Pricesit), is the main independent 
variable that captures the real estate shock that a given bank is facing. It can be written as 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑖0𝑃𝑚𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1 . It 
measures the weighted average of the real estate prices Pmt of each of the locations in which the bank is located, using as 
weights the relative importance of each location in terms of deposits (wim0 is a static weight at t0). In Panel B, Pmt (local MSA-
level real estate price) is predicted using land supply inelasticity interacted with aggregate (national) real estate prices (as 
measured by the Case-Shiller US House Price Index). All specifications include bank-MSA and MSA-quarter fixed effects. In 
all specifications, we report robust standard errors that cluster at the bank level. 
Panel A 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
All dep. variables in logs 
Equity 
Issuance 
Expenses 
on 
premises 
Non-
interest 
expense 
Interest 
and non-
interest 
expense 
Trading 
assets 
Investment 
securities 
Cash and 
balances 
        
Log(House Pricesit) -0.011 0.091 0.166 0.341** -0.198 0.153 -0.035 
 (-0.04) (0.66) (1.20) (2.27) (-0.57) (0.31) (-0.20) 
        
Bank*MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Obs 49,569 97,954 97,969 97,969 97,969 93,440 97,967 
R
2
 0.694 0.940 0.936 0.933 0.962 0.904 0.918 
 
Panel B 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Equity 
Issuance 
Expenses 
on 
premises 
Non-
interest 
expense 
Interest and 
non-interest 
expense 
Trading 
assets 
Investment 
securities 
Cash and 
balances 
        
House Pricesit * PP&Ebranch,2005 0.001 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.055*** 0.069*** 0.021*** 
 (1.36) (21.37) (20.14) (20.79) (2.77) (6.26) (10.03) 
        
Bank*MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Obs 91,436 95,987 95,987 95,987 95,987 91,522 95,987 
R
2
 0.012 0.709 0.779 0.776 0.612 0.705 0.433 
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Table 6: The effect of real estate prices on banks’ operations: large banks 
Panel A shows the results of estimating the log specification as in Equation (1), while Panel B shows the results of estimating 
Equation (2). The dependent variables ymit are: tier 1 capital (RCFD8274), total loans (RCFD2122), tier 2 capital (RCFD8275) 
and equity issuance (defined as the quarterly change in tier 1 capital). Dependent variables ymit are defined at a bank-location 
level that is created as the product of an outcome variable yit defined for bank i at time t (quarter) and a time-varying bank-
location weight, wmit. The weight wmit is constructed as the fraction of deposits of bank i in location m with respect to the total 
deposits of the bank. Dummy variable Large takes the value 1 if the bank-branch belongs to a top-20 bank holding company in 
terms of total assets. The independent variable in Panel A, Log(House Pricesit), captures the real estate shock that a given bank 
is facing. It can be written as 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑖0𝑃𝑚𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1 . It measures the weighted average of the real estate prices Pmt 
of each of the locations in which the bank is located, using as weights the relative importance of each location in terms of 
deposits (wim0 is a static weight at t0). In Panel B, Pmt (local MSA-level real estate price) is predicted using land supply 
inelasticity interacted with aggregate (national) real estate prices (as measured by the Case-Shiller US House Price Index). All 
specifications include bank-MSA and MSA-quarter fixed effects. In all specifications, we report robust standard errors that 
cluster at the bank level. 
 
Panel A 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
All dep. variables in logs 
Tier 1 
Capital 
Tier 2 
Capital 
Loans 
Equity 
Issuance 
          
Log(House Pricesit) 0.142 -0.059 0.182* 0.023 
 (1.28) (-0.39) (1.67) (0.10) 
Log(House Pricesit)*Large bank 0.010 -0.009** 0.014 -0.010 
 (1.32) (-2.05) (0.93) (-0.23) 
     
Bank*MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Obs 97,565 97,048 97,239 49,569 
R
2
 0.674 0.787 0.712 0.566 
Panel B 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Tier 1 
Capital 
Tier 2 
Capital 
Loans 
Equity 
Issuance 
          
House Pricesit * PP&Ebranch,2005 0.031*** 0.014*** 0.269*** 0.000 
 (12.64) (8.17) (6.92) (1.23) 
Large bank*House Pricesit * PP&Ebranch,2005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.069*** 0.001 
 (-0.79) (-0.85) (-3.01) (0.65) 
     
Bank*MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Obs 95,987 95,987 95,987 91,436 
R
2
 0.851 0.785 0.814 0.083 
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External Appendix: 
 
To test whether our assumption that a bank’s lending activity in a certain location is correlated with its deposit activity in the same 
location, we run several tests, as shown in Table A.1 – Table A.5 
In Table A.1 we show results of estimating Equation (1) in Panel A, and Equation (2) in Panel B, whereby in our weighting 
procedure to construct the dependent variables we use the loan-based bank-MSA weights obtained from the CRA database,  instead 
of calculating bank MSA weights using deposits. As we can see from Panel A and Panel B, our results remain unchanged. 
 
Table A1: 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) 
All dep. variables in logs 
Tier 1 
Capital 
Tier 2 
Capital 
Loans 
        
    
Log(House Pricesit) 1.188** 1.441* 1.374** 
 
(2.06) (1.95) (2.32) 
    
Bank*MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Obs 3,947 3,948 3,948 
R
2
 0.825 0.841 0.827 
 
Panel B  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Tier 1 
Capital 
Tier 2 
Capital 
Loans 
        
    
House Pricesit * 
PP&Ebranch,2005 
0.029*** 
(3.53) 
0.010*** 
(2.63) 
0.266*** 
(3.40) 
 
   
    
Bank*MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Obs 3,827 3,827 3,827 
R
2
 0.669 0.612 0.629 
 
 
.
In Table A.2, we show correlations between actual CRA and deposit-based MSA weights (both static – computed using 
deposit shares in 2005Q4; and running – computed using the current quarter), for all banks, and for single-MSA and multi-
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MSA banks. In the whole sample, we can see that the correlations between CRA-based and deposit-based weights are positive 
and highly significant, ranging from 0.69 for running weights, to 0.71 for static weights. For multi-MSA banks, the correlation 
between CRA-based and deposit-based running weights 0.52, while for static weights it is 0.54 
 
Table A.2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
All Banks 
 
Single-MSA 
Banks Multi-MSA Banks 
 
Loans 
MSA 
Weight 
Static MSA 
Weight Loans Loans 
MSA 
Weight 
Static 
MSA 
Weight 
                
CRA Loans 0.259*** 
 
  0.851*** 0.159*** 
  
 
(37.52) 
 
  (62.30) (25.26) 
  CRA MSA Weight 
 
0.694***     
 
0.519*** 
 
  
(79.45)     
 
(44.68) 
 Static CRA MSA Weight 
  
0.709***   
  
0.535*** 
   
(80.01)   
  
(44.94) 
   
    
   Observations 3,953 3,953 3,953 708 3,245 3,245 3,245 
R-squared 0.263 0.615 0.618 0.846 0.164 0.381 0.384 
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In Table A.3 we show results of estimating Equation (1) for Table 3 from the main text, whereby in our weighting procedure to 
construct the dependent variables we use the number of offices a bank has in an MSA (scaled by total number of offices that a bank 
operates) in Panel A, and by using 1/n, where n is the number of MSAs in which the bank operates, as the weights in our dependent 
variable construction in Panel B, instead of calculating bank MSA weights using deposits. As we can see from Panel A and Panel B, 
our results remain unchanged. 
 
Table A.3:  
 
Panel A: Office weights 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
All dep. variables in logs ReLoans LoansToDep AgriLoans CILoans 
Individual
Loans 
Foreign
Loans 
Obligations Loans-NonDep Leases 
                    
Log(House Pricesit) 0.217*** 2.868** 0.267 0.008 -0.013 -1.333 -0.632*** -0.255 0.271 
 (2.71) (2.31) (1.14) (0.08) (-0.12) (-0.56) (-2.58) (-1.29) (0.56) 
          
Bank*MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Obs 91,169 30,865 66,469 60,199 91,137 14,082 59,305 80,072 39,287 
R
2
 0.949 0.853 0.921 0.963 0.955 0.846 0.880 0.903 0.915 
 
Panel B: 1/n weights 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
All dep. variables in logs ReLoans LoansToDep AgriLoans CILoans 
Individual
Loans 
Foreign
Loans 
Obligations Loans-NonDep Leases 
                    
Log(House Pricesit) 0.214*** 2.878** 0.271 0.015 -0.014 -1.308 -0.627** -0.258 0.284 
 (2.66) (2.31) (1.16) (0.15) (-0.14) (-0.55) (-2.55) (-1.31) (0.58) 
          
Bank*MSA fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Obs 91,169 30,865 66,469 60,199 91,137 14,082 59,305 80,072 39,287 
R
2
 0.949 0.853 0.921 0.963 0.955 0.846 0.880 0.903 0.915 
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In Table A.4 we show results of estimating Equation (1) for Table 4 from the main text, whereby in our weighting procedure to 
construct the dependent variables we use the number of offices a bank has in an MSA (scaled by total number of offices that a bank 
operates) in Panel A, and by using 1/n, where n is the number of MSAs in which the bank operates, as the weights in our dependent 
variable construction in Panel B, instead of calculating bank MSA weights using deposits. As we can see from both panels, our 
results remain unchanged. 
 
Table A.4 
 
Panel A: Office weights 
  Non-performing loans by type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
All dep. variables in 
logs 
Non-
performing 
loans 
Commercial 
and 
Industrial 
Farmer 
Restructured 
loans 
Other non-
performin
g assets 
Commercia
l real estate 
Credit card 
         
Log(House Pricesit) -2.263*** -1.560*** -1.777*** -3.361*** -0.697*** -1.931*** -0.611 
 (-6.56) (-6.41) (-3.88) (-6.48) (-2.75) (-5.30) (-1.52) 
        
Bank*MSA fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Obs 97,930 97,969 97,969 97,961 97,969 97,969 97,889 
R
2
 0.785 0.949 0.671 0.601 0.753 0.590 0.783 
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Panel B: 1/n weights 
  Non-performing loans by type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
All dep. variables in 
logs 
Non-
performing 
loans 
Commercial 
and 
Industrial 
Farmer 
Restructured 
loans 
Other non-
performin
g assets 
Commercia
l real estate 
Credit card 
         
Log(House Pricesit) -2.351*** -1.686*** -2.185*** -4.579*** -1.026*** -2.610*** -0.678 
 (-6.75) (-6.00) (-3.05) (-6.75) (-3.02) (-5.56) (-1.62) 
        
Bank*MSA fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA*quarter fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Obs 97,930 97,969 97,969 97,924 97,969 97,969 97,889 
R
2
 0.750 0.962 0.684 0.629 0.845 0.706 0.759 
 
During the 2006-10 period, there has been a significant M&A activity in the banking sector. Additionally, there were more 
than 300 bank failures during this time. To address the concern that not including bank failures might underestimate our 
results, we estimate our main specifications, but drop the bank*MSA fixed effects, so banks are treated as being re-born every 
period and, in particular, merged banks are treated as new banks. 
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Table A.5: Mergers 
 
 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) 
All dep. variables in logs 
Tier 1 
Capital 
Tier 2 
Capital 
Loans 
        
    
Log(House Pricesit) 0.975*** 1.117*** 2.528*** 
 (2.77) (3.55) (4.59) 
    
Bank*MSA fixed effect No No No 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Obs 97,565 97,239 97,048 
R
2
 0.162 0.148 0.166 
 
Panel B  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Tier 1 
Capital 
Tier 2 
Capital 
Loans 
        
    
House Pricesit * 
PP&Ebranch,2005 
0.036*** 
(8.97) 
0.013*** 
(11.01) 
0.271*** 
(6.734) 
 
   
    
Bank*MSA fixed effect No No No 
MSA*quarter fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Obs 95,987 95,987 95,987 
R
2
 0.624 0.615 0.679 
 
 
